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COVID-19 has played out in Romania in a similar way to that in many other European countries. 
The government implemented decisive early measures which were able to keep the infection and 
mortality rates relatively low. This paper considers three distinctive aspects of the situation in 
Romania. First, the situation was complicated by the influence of transnational migrant workers, 
large numbers of whom returned to Romania when the pandemic started, accounting for distinct 
geographical variations in the rates of infection. At the same time, large numbers were able to 
leave the country at the height of the pandemic because they were ‘needed’ for low-paid 
agricultural/social care work in western European countries. Second, the pandemic placed 
tension on Romania’s relationship with the EU, whilst highlighting a number of existing issues 
between Romania and its neighbours. Third, Romania’s strict lockdown measures exacerbated 
long-standing internal tensions, particularly with regard to the large and marginalised Roma 
community. The paper concludes by considering some of the possible longer-term implications 
for Romania of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 






Romania, like all other European countries, was unable to escape COVID-19. The first case was 
reported on 26 February 2020 in a 25-year-old man who had been in contact with an Italian visitor 
on a hunting trip (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2020). By March other outbreaks were 
reported in southern, western and northern Romania. The first fatality was recorded on 22 
March. All cases arose from contacts with other European countries. There were no reported 
cases of the virus spreading directly from China, probably since Romania has no direct flights with 
China. 
 
This paper aims to review developments in Romania up to 1st June 2020. We focus on three 
significant themes: 1) the role of transnational labour as a vector through which the virus spread 
to (and within) Romania;  2) the impact of the pandemic on Romania’s relations with the EU and 
with its neighbours, particularly Hungary and the Republic of Moldova; and 3) internal tensions 
within Romania, especially those relating to the large Roma community. This analysis is based on 
a critical reading of press reportage (both Romanian and international) of the pandemic, along 
with a range of supplementary statistical data produced both in and outside Romania.  
 
 
The Response to COVID-19 in Romania 
 
The Romanian state responded to the pandemic by following the World Health Organisation 
guidelines and by enforcing a rigorous lockdown, modelled on that of Italy. A State of Emergency 
was declared by the President on 16th March 2020, lasting for an initial period of 30 days (it was 
subsequently extended). Emergency legislation was passed through Military Ordinances. The 
lockdown (involving severe limitations on movement and a strict nightly curfew) was enforced 
by the police, assisted by the army. Punitive fines (reportedly the highest in Europe) were 
introduced for breaking the lockdown, with 300,000 people being fined, generating 600 million 
lei (€120 million) (Păvălucă 2020). This was the largest restriction of civil liberties since the fall of 
communism: indeed, Romania under lockdown bore some resemblance to the grotesque 
authoritarianism of Nicolae Ceauşescu’s regime. Nevertheless, the lockdown was accepted and 
respected by the majority of the population.  
 
The lockdown was relaxed to a ‘State of Alert’ on 15th May under which citizens were required to 
wear face masks in public institutions, in shops and closed markets, and when travelling on public 
transport. Some smaller shops (but not hotels or restaurants) were permitted to open. 
Restrictions on mobility were eased but those people wanting to travel outside of the settlement 
where they live permanently were required to carry a declaration of motives. Domestic and 
international flights also resumed with strict regulations in airports. From 1st  June the relaxation 
was listed further to include hotels, with restaurants permitted to open after 15th June.  
 
Given the large number of Romanians who recently returned to Romania from other European 
countries Romania’s response has been relatively successful. Despite a ‘brain drain’ of health 
professionals over the past decade (Gillet 2020), Romania’s health system has largely coped with 
the pandemic. By 1st June 2020 a total of 19,398 cases had been reported with 1,276 deaths, 
placing Romania in 25th place in the global mortality table (Johns Hopkins University 2020). On 
the other hand, the impact of the pandemic on the Romanian economy has been significant: GDP 
was forecast to fall by 4%, while the fiscal deficit was forecast to rise to 9% of GDP (Milatovic and 
Cracan 2020). Many employees saw their jobs suspended, and unemployment increased by 
276,000 between March and April (Anon 2020a).  
 
 
The Return of Transnational Migrant Workers 
 
Since Romania joined the EU in 2007 its citizens have enjoyed the right to travel to, and work in, 
other EU countries. Consequently, large numbers of Romanians (predominantly the young and 
well-educated) have left Romania in search of temporary or permanent employment in EU 
countries. In 2015/16 an estimated 3.6 million people born in Romania were working in OECD 
countries (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2019). At the same time the 
Romanian population has fallen significantly, from 21.6 million in 2005 to an estimated 19.2 
million in 2020 (Institutul Naţional de Statistică 2006, 2017). Work-related emigration presents 
Romania with two problems. The first is a ‘brain drain’ of talented young people seeking better 
opportunities and higher salaries abroad (Goschin et al. 2013). The second is an increasingly aging 
population remaining within the country, particularly within rural areas (Bodogai and Cutler 
20143), thereby placing Romania in the “greying periphery” of Europe (Kulcsár and Brădăţan 
2014). 
 
The largest communities of Romanians working within the EU are found in Italy and Spain, where 
over one million and half a million Romanians respectively are now based (OCED 2019). This 
situation has its origin in the cultural and linguistic similarities between these countries, 
particularly since Romanian, Italian and Spanish are all Romance languages. However, significant 
communities of Romanian migrant workers are also found in Austria, France, Germany, Greece 
and the UK. Romanian transnational migrants make a significant contribution to the Romanian 
economy sending remittances of almost €6 billion home each year, representing almost 2% of 
GDP (Mehedintu et al. 2020). 
 
Romanians working abroad represent a significant transnational workforce (Duval 2003) who, 
whilst being settled in their country of work, also maintain significant ties with “home” (Marcu 
2011, 2014). Indeed, many migrants return to Romania each year (OCED 2019), either 
temporarily or permanently. When the COVID-19 pandemic gathered pace in March and April 
2020 many Romanian migrants (particularly in Italy and Spain, both severely impacted by the 
pandemic) sought to return to Romania. An estimated 250,000 Romanians (including 50,000 from 
Italy) returned in March alone (Anon 2020b), in some cases unwittingly bringing COVID-19 with 
them. This movement of people was intensified by the annual return of up to 1.3 million migrants 
to celebrate the Romanian Orthodox Easter on 19th April (Gherasim 2020). This phenomenon was 
not exclusive to Romania: around the world many migrant workers headed for home if they were 
able to (Mençutek 2020), producing significant flows of people, both internationally and 
domestically. In their responses to the pandemic, governments have largely overlooked the 
dilemmas faced by transnational migrant workers. Yet this is a group who may fail to recognize 
the seriousness of the pandemic and who are known to experience additional barriers in 
accessing health care in the countries in which they work (Liem et al. 2020).  
 
These trends help explain the distinct geography of COVID-19 infections in Romania (Guvernul 
României 2020). While infections have been reported in each of Romania’s 41 counties, the 
largest concentration of cases has been in the northeast of the country. In mid-May three 
counties in the northeast of the country (Suceava, Neamţ and Botoşani) accounted for 34% of all 
cases. This has traditionally been an area of poverty and high unemployment (Turnock 2005) and 
for this reason this area was characterised by a large number of transnational migrant workers. 
Another concentration was in the west of the country (the counties of Arad and Timiş, accounting 
for 7% of cases) along the border with Hungary, thought to arise from over 250,000 Romanian 
migrants who returned home by land (Pora 2020). While this is generally the most affluent part 
of the country there are pockets of poverty such as the county of Hunedoara (3.7% of cases), an 
area hit hard by the restructuring of communist-era industries and which subsequently has high 
rates of poverty and out-migration. Inevitably there has been a high concentration in Bucharest 
(a city of almost 2 million people) which accounted for 10% of cases. Yet there are curious 
anomalies. Maramureş – another county where the population has a long tradition of working 
abroad – had a low rate of infection (0.5% of cases). So too did the county of Harghita (0.4% of 
cases), an area with a high proportion of ethnic Hungarians and low rates of work-related 
outmigration (COVID19ro.org 2020).  
 
However, while large numbers of Romanian migrant workers returned to Romania their absence 
was noted in the countries in which they worked. With their own populations in lockdown, a 
number of western European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) were 
increasingly concerned about a shortage both of agricultural labourers needed to pick crops, and 
workers taking care of the elderly. In Germany, agricultural lobbies pressed the government to 
allow Romanian workers to come and pick their crops (particularly asparagus). At a time when 
the population was in lockdown, the Romanian government agreed a specific exemption for 
agricultural workers (Rogozanu and Gabor 2020). Consequently, several thousand Romanians 
who were ‘needed’ abroad – many from the poorer regions that were already hardest hit by 
COVID-19 – crammed onto buses and planes (with little social distancing) to board flights to 
Germany. Similar arrangements for Romanian workers were made in various other countries: in 
total 188 specially chartered flights left Romania for western European countries at a time when 
scheduled flights were suspended (Mutler 2020). In other cases, dedicated trains were provided 
such as those for care workers working with the elderly, which departed from the western city 
of Timişoara bound for Vienna.  
 
The reliance on eastern European workers to do low-paid jobs in western European countries 
was nothing new, but the whole issue was thrown into sharper focus by the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Since EU enlargement, labour migrants from new accession countries have been frequently 
presented in terms of threats to both the economy (through ‘taking’ jobs from local workers) and 
the welfare system of the destination countries (Hellwig and Sinno 2017; Eberl et al. 2018). In 
particular, some mainstream media coverage has focused on stereotyping and denigrating EU 
migrant workers, emphasising issues of criminal behaviour and delinquency (ibid; Rasinger 2010; 
Dursun-Ozkanca 2011; Fox et al. 2012; Tong and Zuo 2018). Such representations are 
contemporary forms of a long-standing process: the ongoing imagining of the east of Europe as 
‘other’ (Kuus, 2004; Light and Young 2009; Ibrahim and Howarth 2016). This is a discourse which 
has been particularly prevalent in the case of Romania in countries such as the UK where media 
representations of Romanian migrant workers after 2007 have been consistently negative, 
portraying such people in a variety of ways as a threat to existing ways of life (Mawby and Gisby 
2008; Light and Young 2009; Fox et al. 2012; Tong and Zuo 2018).  
 
However, in spring 2020, this discourse took on a new form. It was now recognised that migrants 
from the east of Europe were ‘necessary’, since the economies of many western European 
countries were now dependent on flexible and mobile migrant labour. Furthermore, insecurity 
over food supplies was not something governments were willing to risk at a time when their 
populations were in lockdown. In countries such as the UK - where 98% of fruit pickers were EU 
migrant workers (Doward 2020) – the problem was exaggerated when British workers proved 
unwilling to take on agricultural work, despite a national appeal for them to do so. Furthermore, 
a shortage of agricultural labour presented an existential threat to the survival of some British 
farms (ibid). COVID-19 threw EU migrant workers into the spotlight: they were suddenly visible 
and increasingly recognised as essential. 
 
At the same time, the pandemic also highlighted the exploitation and inequality experienced by 
migrant workers from the east of Europe. Agricultural labours from Romania and other countries 
faced long working days, poor pay, poor working conditions (lacking protective equipment) and 
substandard accommodation in which large numbers of people were housed, preventing social 
distancing. There were COVID-19 outbreaks at workplaces in Germany and the Netherlands, with 
over 200 Romanians being infected at one abattoir in Germany (Mutler 2020). At one point, 
migrant Romanian workers protested in Bonn about unpaid salaries and working conditions 
(ibid). The working conditions of Romanian temporary migrant workers received an 
unprecedented level of attention, with both the German and Romanian media portraying such 
work as a form of modern slavery (Soric 2020; Stănescu 2020). These events demonstrated the 
inadequacy of labour protection legislation for vulnerable seasonable migrant workers but the 
broader issue appeared to be that protecting the food supplies of western European countries 
took precedence over the health and safety of eastern European workers. A group of 28 labour 
and human rights organisations from across Europe produced a joint statement calling on the EU 
to reform the Common Agricultural Policy and guarantee the labour rights of agricultural workers 
(European Public Health Alliance 2020). A broader issue concerning the role of seasonal workers 
in spreading COVID-19 (both in their country of work, and when they return home) is, as yet, 
poorly understood.  
 
 
Geopolitics: Relations with the EU and Neighbouring States 
 
The Romanian state has long been closely aligned with the EU, while Romanians are enthusiastic 
about EU membership (perhaps to compensate for a dismal lack of trust in their own politicians). 
For example, a survey in 2016 reported that 73% of Romanians approved of EU membership; and 
52% supported closer political union with the EU (YouGov 2016). Nevertheless, given that health 
policy is the responsibility of individual states, the EU has not played a major role in Romania’s 
response to COVID-19. Romania benefitted from central EU purchasing of PPE under the ‘rescEU’ 
package (Goniewicz et al. 2020). The EU Commission supported proposals by the Romanian 
government to offer €3.3 billion of financial support to SMEs during the pandemic (European 
Commission 2020). Romania also stands to benefit from a share of the EU’s proposed €750 billion 
recovery fund (Anon 2020c). Overall, however, the response to COVID-19 in Romania has been a 
national rather than supranational effort.  
 
Indeed, the COVID-19 crisis may be reshaping popular geopolitical imaginings of the EU. A survey 
in March 2020 indicated that 74% of respondents considered that the EU could do more to 
address the pandemic, while 46% were dissatisfied with the help from the EU to eradicate the 
virus (Anon 2020d). Another survey in April reported that only 50% were satisfied with the 
measures taken by the EU, while a minority (41%) were satisfied with the solidarity shown 
between EU member states (Anon 2020e). These findings do not necessarily indicate a wider 
unhappiness about EU membership (still less an emerging Euroscepticism) but perhaps a 
recognition of the limits to what the EU can do for Romania. What may be more telling is that 
when asked which country was likely to provide the help needed to end the pandemic the country 
mentioned most often was China (22%) with the EU recording only 14% (Anon 2020d). Although 
relations between Romania and China are not especially close, the Chinese Embassy in Romania 
provided medical equipment for Bucharest City Hall, while some cities in China sent medical 
supplies to their ‘twin’ cities in Romania. Romania has also benefitted from supplies of protective 
equipment from China arranged by private companies and individuals (Oehler-Şincai 2020), in 
addition to central EU stocks supplied by China. 
 
The pandemic has also impacted on Romania’s relations with neighbouring states. Relations with 
Hungary have been tense for some time, due to Romanian suspicions of the nationalist policies 
of Victor Orbán’s government. As the COVID-19 crisis worsened Hungary closed all but one of its 
border crossings on 17 March 2020, creating lengthy queues. Romanians were later allowed to 
return through Hungary into Romania but only during overnight hours, using dedicated “green 
roads” kept open for freight traffic (Reuters 2020). All border crossings were reopened on 15 
May. Tension with Hungary increased after the lower house of Romania’s parliament adopted a 
law allowing a degree of cultural autonomy for the Hungarian-speaking Szekler region of 
Transylvania. This happened by default since draft laws must be debated within 45 days or are 
otherwise adopted: parliament had been closed by the pandemic and so had not debated the 
law (Barberá 2020). Romania’s president – an ethnic Saxon from Transylvania – denounced this 
situation (Mediafax 2020) although it was rejected by the upper house (Senate) the following 
day. Victor Orbán responded by posting on Facebook a map of “Greater Hungary” showing 
Transylvania as part of Hungary (Holroyd 2020). This inevitably infuriated many Romanians and 
intensified long-standing distrust of their neighbour.  
 
Romania has used the COVID-19 crisis to show its continued solidarity with the Republic of 
Moldova which has faced its own problems of infection through returning migrant workers. In an 
effort to increase its soft power influence, Romania sent donations of medicine, protective 
equipment and medical personnel to Moldova in April and May, something that was presented 
as a “humanitarian gesture” (Anon 2020f, 2020g). However, Moldova under its Russophile Prime 
Minister, Ion Chicu, has responded coolly. In May 2020 Chicu launched an attack on Romania 
describing it as the most corrupt country in Europe. Chicu also criticized Romania’s response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, pointing that the number of infections in a single county (Suceava) was 
half the number reported in the whole of the Republic of Moldova (Anon 2020h). This soured 
diplomatic relations between the two countries, with the Romanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
expressing its disappointment with Chicu, given the solidarity and humanitarian support Romania 
had offered Moldova (ProTV 2020). Elsewhere, relations with Bulgaria and Ukraine (which have 
never been particularly close) are unchanged, while Serbia (traditionally a closer ally) has closed 
its border with Romania and looked to China and Russia for support. Romania has kept a close 
eye on relations between Greece and Turkey, fearing an influx of migrants from Syria and a 
possible new source of infection.  
 
 
Internal Tensions with the Roma Community  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated internal tensions with Romania’s large but 
impoverished Roma community (who constitute up to 10% of the population). In particular, the 
crisis has heightened the existing discrimination and stigmatisation of Roma (Creţan and Powell 
2018; Creţan and O’Brien 2019). Roma people have long been subject to racism, exclusion and 
ghettoization in Europe. Moreover, lack of access to education, the formal labour market, and 
housing (O’Nions 2010; van Baar 2011; Soaita 2017), result in the wider public considering Roma 
in terms of social risk and holding them responsible for their own situation (van Baar 2011; 
Maestri 2016). Local authority policies have often been inadequate to deal with the many 
problems faced by Roma communities and, in some cases, policy has been an overt response to 
populist discontent (sometimes stirred by right wing political parties) against marginalized and 
ghettoized Roma people (Creţan and O’Brien 2019). 
Research on Roma stigmatisation has focused on the marginal spatial and socioeconomic position 
of Roma, mainly within Eastern Europe, with persistent inequalities and poor housing condition 
leading to their differential treatment as ‘others’ in political and everyday discourses. Roma are 
stereotyped as beggars, drug dealers and prostitutes and are stigmatized, regardless of their 
economic position in Romania. Although internalization of stigma is little-researched, it generally 
points to defensive strategies adopted by Roma (regardless of their social position, class or 
wealth) to avoid stigmatization (Creţan and Powell 2018). In this way, policies need to facilitate 
a better understanding of the distinct urban power relations that shape Roma stigmatisation and 
reveal how this long-term historical process has recently been accentuated at the larger 
European scale (Powell and Lever 2017). Social-environmental justice and empowerment of 
Roma could be possible future solutions for solving current inequalities (Malovics et al. 2019), 
even though recent policies dealing with the marginalisation of Roma communities have merely 
been based on “political pragmatism”, while power differences between Roma and non-Roma 
still exist. Generally, there is a need for policies to enable the formal participation of Roma in the 
labour market as routes to economic inclusion and “empowerment” and economic inclusion, 
with proper desegregation and more reciprocal Roma - non-Roma interactions (Creţan and 
Powell 2018). 
These existing prejudices against Roma have worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic. For 
example, the first case in the city of Timişoara was a Roma child, and a local politician attributed 
infection to the child’s environment, rather than spread within the classroom (Matache and 
Bhabha 2020). Furthermore, the Romanian press has been swift to condemn the actions of Roma, 
particularly in cases where Roma communities had not observed the lockdown restrictions. As a 
result, some Roma communities have faced additional restrictions beyond those experienced by 
other ethnic groups in Romania. For example, one town with a majority Roma population – 
Tăndărei, in southern Romania – was quarantined by Military Ordinance after Roma families 
were reported to have gathered in large numbers over Easter for family celebrations (the local 
quarantine was lifted in May). In other settlements rates of infection among Roma have been 
particularly high due to reluctance to adhere to the lockdown requirements. Roma appear to 
have been disproportionately fined and harassed and, in some cases, beaten by police, 
something that has been widely reported around the globe (Lee 2020), provoking concern among 
human rights organisations (e.g. Matache and Bhabha 2020). 
Tensions between Roma and police or other groups living mainly in the suburbs have occasionally 
erupted into street violence. Such incidents occurred in the Rahova neighbourhood of Bucharest 
and in other cities (Hunedoara, Ploieşti), and towns (Codlea, Săcele) (Anon 2020i). Most incidents 
arose from disputes between neighbours, or street parties that disturbed public order. In some 
cases, police crews were attacked with shovels, stones, and other improvised weapons, and their 
cars were damaged. Armed special intervention forces were called in to defuse the conflicts. Such 
events were particularly prevalent during the period of the Orthodox Easter due to an 
intermingling of poverty and a lack of job opportunities, connected to strict lockdown measures 
which were not accompanied by a clearly-defined policy for socio-economic rebuilding on the 
part of the Romanian government. 
 
Conclusion: Romania after COVID-19 
 
What will Romania look like once the pandemic is over? There is a widespread expectation among 
Romanians of a period of economic austerity. One survey in April reported that 81% expected 
the post-pandemic crisis to be long and difficult, and 59% anticipated a rise in crime (Anon 2020j). 
After the pandemic there is likely to be an increase in poverty and social deprivation which will 
exacerbate existing inequalities between rich and poor, and between urban and rural areas. 
COVID-19 may also bring about wider social change, particularly among the poorest and most 
marginalised parts of the population. The combination of the health risks of living in high-density 
urban neighbourhoods, and the recent loss of job opportunities in the informal sector may push 
the urban poor back towards rural areas (thereby reversing a long trend of rural-to-urban 
migration in Romania) and bringing about a degree of de-urbanisation.  
 
In a post-pandemic recession the pressure on Romanians to seek seasonal or permanent 
employment in EU countries will increase considerably. On one hand, transnational employment 
opportunities in western Europe may be considerably reduced as each country faces its own 
period of recession and rising unemployment. On the other hand, the pandemic has illustrated 
the dependence of western European economies on low-cost migrant labour from the eastern 
countries of the EU. Recession could push still more Romanians to seek work in other EU states 
and could also mean greater reliance among those remaining in the country on the remittances 
sent home by workers able to find a job outside Romania. Whether the pandemic brings about a 
long-term improvement in the working conditions of east European seasonal workers remains to 
be seen. 
 
In Romania, as in some other countries, there is emerging disillusionment (particularly among 
the poor and elderly) with globalization and neoliberalism and a preference among some 
Romanians for localism and nationalism. This, however, is nothing new and reflects a long-
standing division within Romania between those advocating closer alignment with western 
European norms and those preferring nativist and national values (Verdery 1991). The 
combination of poverty and growing scepticism about the EU could create conditions where 
Romania returns to the extreme nationalism and anti-minority sentiments that characterized the 
immediate post-communist period. As recent developments in Hungary demonstrate, this would 
strain Romania’s relationship with the EU. On the other hand, the far right has dramatically 
declined in influence in Romania over the past decade. Furthermore, there is also widespread 
recognition both that EU support will be necessary for Romania’s economic recovery, and that 
EU membership creates many opportunities for employment. Therefore, if Romania is able to 
resist the lure of nationalism it could emerge from the pandemic with its reputation enhanced 
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